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The author is a visiting faculty member in economics at Caltech. At the time the original 
version of this paper was written, he was Managing Director at First Quadrant 2, with 
responsibility for global active equity portfolios totaling $6 billon. Dr. Leinweber has a 
long background in electronic trading. He is the inventor of MarketMind, the expert 
system now incorporated in ITG’s Quantex product, and a founder of Codexa, which 
provided internet information filters for institutional investors and traders. He holds a 
Ph.D. in applied mathematics from Harvard University and undergraduate degrees from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
The centerpiece of this paper is a comprehensive analysis of all of the trading by a large 
US pension fund in 1991. The first version was published in the Summer 1995 issue of the 
Journal of Investing and later incorporated in the AIMR’s CFA reading. This updated 
version, requested by the AIMR, reflects the technological and market structure changes 
of the last ten years, and adds a new empirical analysis of all the 2001 trading by a $7 
billion US equity manager. 
Trading technology has changed in many ways, yet many of the same characteristics of 
institutional trading are seen just as strongly as they were before. The attention given to 
large difficult orders still shows in lower than expected trading costs. Small “no-
brainer” orders still represent the largest component of overall trading costs. These are 
precisely the type of costs that modern electronic trading systems are designed to reduce. 
The idea that trading costs were a substantial drag on performance was a relatively 
novel in 1991. Today, it is a central concern for many managers, including those profiled 
here.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Trading is the implementation of investment ideas, and the quality of the implementation 
is as important as the idea itself.  For small transactions in large markets, this is not a major 
concern.  As the transaction size grows, or when smaller markets are involved, it becomes 
important for investment managers and their clients to pay more attention to implementation. 
 The original version of this article [Leinweber 1995] presented some surprising results 
from an analysis of a large U.S. pension fund’s equity trading, and describes how some of these 
lessons are being applied in the management of equity portfolios.  This update revisits the same 
ground, after a decade of intense technological change. 
 
REAL PORTFOLIOS AND PAPER PORTFOLIOS  
 Virtually all equity managers have personal experiences suggesting that paper portfolios 
outperform real ones.  A paper portfolio is an imaginary holding consisting of all the security 
positions the investor decides to hold, acquired at the midquote price that prevailed at the time 
they decided to hold them.  Paper portfolios incur no commissions, no taxes, no bid-ask spreads, 
no market impact, and no opportunity costs.  Real portfolios incur all of these costs. 
 The best way to measure transactions costs is to look at the difference between real and 
paper portfolios.  This was first suggested in [Treynor 1981].  Andre Pérold, in a frequently cited 
paper [Perold 1988], named this difference “the implementation shortfall.” 
 A famous example of the implementation shortfall is the striking difference between the 
performance of the paper ValueLine portfolio and the real ValueLine fund (see Exhibit 1).  From 
1979 to 1991, the ValueLine paper portfolio has an annualized return of 26.2%.  The real 
ValueLine fund lags substantially, with an annualized return of only 16.1%.  Yet the fund was 
making the same trades recommended in the newsletter, with only a slight delay after publication 
(so as not to front-run their mail subscribers). Clearly, something happened.  That something is 
the cost of implementation. 
Equity trades and managers are increasingly aware of this and, consequently, increasingly 
concerned with transaction costs.  It is now generally understood that these costs have the 
potential to erode or eliminate the value added by money managers.  Trading is the 
implementation of investment ideas, and the quality of the implementation is as important as the 
cleverness of the idea.  The growing appreciation of the role of trading in the investment process 
is reflected in the AIMR’s publication of proposed guidelines on trade management and best 
execution in November 2001.3 
                                                 
3 http://www.aimr.org/pdf/standards/proposed_tmg.pdf  
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Exhibit 1 
Real and Paper Value Line Portfolios 
 
TESTING THE UNTESTED WISDOM 
 There is a large body of untested wisdom about trading.  It has not been a particularly 
popular area of investigation for the academic community (until recently) because of the scarcity 
of data.  In the absence of a well-researched body of empirical and theoretical knowledge, traders 
have developed rules of thumb and informal guidelines to suggest how to achieve the “best 
execution.”  Unfortunately, many of these guidelines are untested or untestable. 
 When trading was done manually, these guidelines were loosely applied.  Today, the 
growth of electronic trading systems has forced the issue of understanding best execution at a 
level of detail sufficiently precise to use in an electronic market.  People now have to write 
computer programs to trade well using automated systems.  Anyone who has ever written any 
sort of computer program knows that it is a great method of finding out precisely what you do 
not know about the subject at hand.  Those “minor details” waved off in a casual conversation 
(or sales pitch) must be filled in before the program will do what it is supposed to do. 
 Motivated by the desire to use electronic trading systems to achieve best execution for 
equity transactions, we empirically investigate over 13,000 equity transactions executed by a 
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large U.S. corporate pension fund in 1991.  The total value of the transactions is approximately 
$2 billion.4 
 The analysis is greatly simplified by two facts: All transactions are purchases, and all 
transactions are completed, so there is no question of how to measure the opportunity costs.  
Trading cost is simply computed using the implementation shortfall method: the trade price less 
the decision price plus commissions. 
 The goals of this study are to empirically test much of the conventional wisdom about 
trading and to shed light on the question of exactly how we can best use electronic trading 
systems.  Our analysis produces a number of unexpected findings: 
• Smaller trades are responsible for a disproportionate share of the costs. The trades 
expected to be low-cost “no-brainers” are not. (This is observed in both the 1991 and 
2001 data.5) 
• Larger trades, generally handled by higher-commission brokers, have lower than 
expected costs. (Also observed in the 2001 data). 
• The expected relationships between management styles and costs are not found. 
Other expectations are confirmed: 
• Skillful execution reduces costs. 
• Patient trading reduces costs. 
• Crossing reduces costs. 
• Some trades produce transactions profits, which partially offset costs. 
TRANSACTION COST PREDICTION 
The industry’s current practices for transaction cost control are strictly “rearview mirror” 
approaches.  You get a report sometime after you complete a transaction telling you how you 
did.  Getting in front of the problem requires predicting costs before the trade is made.  These 
predictions are needed for individual transactions and for portfolios. Research at MIT  [Lo 1993] 
                                                 
4 This updated paper concludes with a brief study of 15,000 transactions in 2001, with a total value exceeding $18 
billion, including buys, sells, short sales, and buys to cover. A more in depth analysis of that data is in progress. 
Check the author’s website www.hss.caltech.edu/~djl/  for details. 
5 Omission of an “also observed in the 2001 data” comment doesn’t imply the opposite. The analysis was much 
more cursory. 
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and [Lo, MacKinlay, and Hausman 1992] is promising in this context.  These models can flag 
problematic trades in advance and provide feedback for portfolio construction decisions. 
 One trading technique, guaranteed principal bids, incurs costs that are fully known before 
the trade is made.  The technique itself, in effect, embodies a perfect “forecast” of trading costs. 
 Reliable transaction cost forecasts can be applied in two places.  The first is in the often 
discussed but seldom-observed integration of portfolio management and trading.  Most portfolio 
construction tools and optimizers use overly simple assumptions about transaction costs, e.g., 
they are the same for all stocks and are expressed as so many cents per share or a fixed 
percentage of the order size.  These assumptions are clearly at variance with the real world.  The 
portfolios that would emerge from these systems if they incorporated more realistic estimates of 
transaction costs are very different from the portfolios produced under the naïve assumptions. 
The cost history of previous transactions in an investment process can be used to 
explicitly predict costs or otherwise influence trading methods used to implement that process in 
the future.  This detailed and explicit consideration of transaction costs is an important link 
between trading and portfolio management. 
 Costs can be measured after the fact, and used to plan future trading.  They can also be 
measured as a trade progresses and used to determine how it will be completed.  This dynamic 
measurement of costs and feedback into a trading program is a valuable cost control technique 
available only to traders using electronic systems capable of keeping up with the process in real 
time.  Measurement is the first step to control on multiple time scales. In 1991, transaction cost 
measurement was truly a boutique service. Ten years later, there are many alternatives for 
managers looking to do this – brokers, consultants, and internal monitoring systems provide a 
much more detailed and timely means of feedback for cost control. 
 
HEAT, LIGHT, AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
 This article began with a discussion of trading costs illustrated by comparing real and 
paper portfolios.  The implementation shortfall method described in that context is the cost 
measure here, but it is not the only measure that can be used to measure costs. The whole subject 
of transaction cost measurement tends to generate quite a bit more heat than light.  Many 
measures have been proposed. The simplest of these are really proxies for transaction costs. 
Examples include bid-ask spread, numbers of trades occurring within the bid-ask spread and the 
like. These are useful in comparing entire markets (e.g. [Chan 1997], [Bessembinder 1997], and 
[Keim and Madhavan 1998]), but they are less informative in telling us about the transactions 
costs incurred by a particular investor. A bid-ask spread of a penny is nice, but largely irrelevant 
to when the size associated with that spread is 200 shares, and the trade in question is for 2 
million shares. 
True transaction costs are fundamentally immeasurable (see [Wagner 1990]).  This is 
because they are the difference between the price you paid and the price that would have 
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prevailed if you had not transacted.  We can never observe this price, so we can never measure 
true cost.  If this were the last word on the subject, we could all go home now, but it is not.   
The implementation shortfall method has been widely accepted by both academic 
economists and market practitioners as a good surrogate measure for true (and therefore 
unobservable) transaction costs. It goes beyond quote data, which are the same for all investors, 
to consider the circumstances applicable to the actual trade made by a particular investor. The 
key feature of the implementation shortfall is that it is based on difference between the price the 
investor decided to transact, and the total price of the transaction, so it fully captures market 
impact, commissions, taxes and all other costs of the completed trade. 
 It is occasionally said that it is futile to attempt to control transaction costs.  You cannot 
measure them precisely, so why try?  This is specious.  The ability to make precise 
measurements of a phenomenon is not required to influence or control it.  
 Recall the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that it is fundamentally 
impossible to perfectly (and simultaneously) measure the position and velocity of a particle such 
as an election.  A single glance at a television or computer screen confirms that we can indeed 
control the little devils well enough to broadcast a Dodgers game or graph the S&P 500, tick by 
tick, on a computer screen in 16 million colors, even if we cannot measure the electrons’ position 
and velocity with perfect precision.  The analogy to transaction costs: Even if we cannot measure 
the costs precisely, we can influence them by the actions we take in executing trades. 
An excellent current update to the literature and technology of transaction cost controls is 
found in [Bruce 2002]. 
 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETS 
 The 1975 legislative mandate to develop a U.S. national market system encouraged 
“maximum reliance on computer and communications technologies.”  This has happened with a 
vengeance, both in the U.S. and around the world.  In 1991, the NYSE’s DOT system handled 
two-thirds of the orders on the world’s largest stock exchange. By 2001, this proportion had risen 
to over 90% of the orders.  NASDAQ used automation to transform itself from a sleepy market 
for small companies to the second largest U.S. equity market. 
At this point, the previous version of this paper listed a large number of then-current 
electronic execution systems. Some are thriving (e.g. POSIT), some are gone (e.g. the Arizona 
Stock Exchange and CompBid). One of the largest efforts to create an electronic market, 
Optimark, had not even begun in 1991. In the intervening years, it attracted a prodigious amount 
of high profile venture capital and publicity, and then disappeared.  Others have taken their 
place. The market for electronic equity executions has been a prime example of Schumpeter’s 
view of capitalism as “a process of creative destruction.” 
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ECNs6, represented only by Instinet in 1991, have proliferated and flourished. 
Collectively, ECNs now account for approximately a third of the volume in NASDAQ stocks. 
The repeal of the NYSE’s Rule 390 has seen the beginning of trading in listed stocks on ECNs.  
The NYSE is now the world’s only major equity market with a traditional trading floor. 
However they have greatly expanded their automated systems, providing both direct execution 
services, and access to floor liquidity via electronic channels. Multiple electronic channels are 
now used for 90% of NYSE orders, representing over 50% of the volume.  
The NYSE limit order book, which could be seen only on the floor for over 200 years, 
was made visible to traders using the OpenBook system, in 2002. This change followed the 
move to decimal pricing, which had reduced the amount of liquidity information conveyed by 
the inside best bid and ask prices. 
 Interestingly, as technology allows the dissemination of limit orders, it also allows 
traders to reduce their use of these orders. Keeping one’s cards hidden is a central feature of all 
trading strategies, but one also needs to be present in the market to capture liquidity. In the past, 
this tradeoff encouraged the placement of limit orders. Now with the increasing ease of  
automated market monitoring and electronic order entry, it is very feasible to keep your limit 
orders to yourself.  This is often referred to as “hidden liquidity”. 
With the clarity of hindsight we can see some patterns. Price discovery has been a hard 
sell. AZX and Optimark both sought to help discover prices, but failed to attract enough volume 
to fuel that process. Primary markets, NASDAQ and the NYSE, provide price discovery as a free 
good to all market participants7.  Anonymity is good. Institutional trading is a game of not 
showing one’s hand. Simplicity wins over complexity. 
The ubiquity of the Internet and its universal standards for high-speed communications 
involving multiple machines has fostered the rapid growth of ECNs and the NYSE/SIAC family 
electronic trading systems for listed stocks. Parallel developments are evident throughout the 
world. 
A new generation of even more sophisticated real-time trading systems are capable of 
implementing trading strategies to be employed across these electronic markets.  Current state of 
the art ideas are embodied in systems like (but not limited to) Quantex, Flextrade, LavaTrade and 
UNX. 
                                                 
6 “Electronic Communication Networks” – A very generic name for systems designed to match up natural buyers 
and sellers. Examples are Archipelago, Brut, Redibook, and Island. In 2002, Archipelago, one of the largest ECNs, 
legally became a registered stock exchange. 
7 The primary markets are acutely aware of this “free rider” issue. They are eager to find ways to derive additional 
revenue what has become virtually cost-free resource to their competitors. 
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 Outside the U.S., we see even more dramatic evidence of the technological trans-
formation of markets.  The trading floor of the London exchange is abandoned, rented out, and 
replaced by information systems.  Toronto’s trading floor closed in 1995, and Tokyo’s in 1998. 
Both replaced by a fully electronic trading systems.   
 Guaranteed principal bid portfolio trading is made possible by technology.  U.S. and 
international investors seeking to control costs increasingly use it. Detailed analysis of portfolios, 
given only their characteristics and the balancing of risk across a large number of portfolios, 
would be impossible without modern computational tools. 
 
PUTTING PROGRESS IN TECHNOLOGY IN PERSPECTIVE 
 Advancing technology makes all of this real.  In the U.S., the consolidated trade and 
quote feeds and the Intermarket Trading System couple diverse market segments.  By the early 
90s, well-wired market participants received machine-readable feeds covering hundreds of world 
markets at rates up to fifty-six kilobits a second. Even though that seems quaint in 2002, it 
corresponds to a full transmission of the entire Wall Street Journal financial listings every three 
seconds. In 2001, they do this on hand held wireless devices. Landlines are ten or a hundred 
times faster. The demands of market data, a text stream, are a negligible load on the bandwidth 
of current networks.  
 What can anyone possibly do with information arriving in such quantities and speeds on 
these “fire hose” data feeds?  The obvious answer is that people alone cannot do anything with 
that much information.  The receiving end always involves a computer.  The kinds of tasks we 
can do with computers have grown so incredibly that, to use them effectively, we have to change 
the way we think about them. 
 No technology in history has progressed as rapidly as electronic computing.  Let’s look at 
this in more detail8.  Two reasonable ways to measure the capacity of a computer are by its 
memory size (in megabytes) and its speed in MIPS (million of instructions per second, in the ads, 
or meaningless index of processor speed, in the EE department).  A reasonable way to measure 
its cost is by its price (in current dollars).  Thus, a good figure of merit for computers is (Memory 
x Speed)/Price. 
 A 1960s-era PDP-1 computer filled a large room.  It operated at about 0.1 MIPS, had 
0.008 megabytes of memory (which the salesman would have called 8K), and cost $250,000.  
Our cost/performance measure turns out to be 0.0000000032.  A modern high-end workstation 
(the kind you find by the truckload on Wall Street) runs at 100 MIPS, has 256 megabytes of 
memory, fits in a desk drawer, and costs about $20,000.  Our figure of merit is now 1.28.  This is 
                                                 
8 Gordon Moore, a founder of Intel Corp, popularized this analogy.  My apologies to readers who have heard this 
before.  It bears repeating. 
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an improvement from the early 1960s by a factor of 400 million (which readers of this Journal 
might call 4,000,000,000,000 basis points).  Exhibit 2 shows this growth in a fairly standard way.  
 To appreciate what this really means, consider what would happen if the same rate of 
progress had occurred in the automobile industry during the same period.  Let’s define a similar 
figure of merit for two cars as (Mileage x Cruising Speed)/Cost.  Two good things multiplied 
together and divided by a bad thing. 
 
Exhibit 2 
Computing Power Per Dollar 
 
 
 We start with a typical 1960s Chevrolet.  It gets 10 mpg, cruises at 75 mpg, and costs 
$2,000.  There are an infinite number of ways to scale up the car’s figure of merit by a factor of 
400 million to match the computer’s progress.  Here is one: the 1994 scaled-up car gets 2,000 
miles per gallon, cruises at 7,500 mph, and costs twelve cents.  This is not really what we would 
consider a car at all; it is a virtually costless, disposable land rocket.  We would use this in very 
different ways from how we use today’s cars.  It would totally change our lives, our economy, 
and our investments. (Of course, we can keep updating these numbers, applying the Moore’s 
Law factor of two every eighteen months. In 2001, that gives us another factor of ten. The 
twelve-cent car now costs 1.2 cents, or it gets 20,000 miles per gallon.  This will continue for at 
least another ten or twenty years, and probably longer. So it becomes a tedious exercise. You all 
get the idea here.) 
 This factor of hundreds of millions typifies the magnitude of the challenge facing the 
securities industry regarding computers: If you had everything computationally, where would you 
put it financially?  One place to put it is in the improvement of the trading process, and a 
reasonable question is: “How?”  This is the motivation for our attempt to understand the nature 
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of the transaction process better and use that factor of 400 million to reduce the cost of 
transacting.  Here are the details. 
 
A $2 BILLION EXPERIMENT  
 We examine 13,651 equity purchase transactions, totaling nearly $2 billion, made by one 
of the largest U.S. corporate pension plans in 1991.  Plexus Group9, a firm that analyzed 
transactions costs, with the cooperation of the fund manager, provided the data.  Trade sizes 
range from 100 shares to blocks of more than 400,000.  Both active and passive management 
styles are represented.  All orders in this sample are filled, some on the first day after the 
decision to trade, some up to twenty-one trading days later.  Because all orders are eventually 
filled, no opportunity costs are observed here.  This simplifies the measurement and 
interpretation of costs, as there is no need to define opportunity costs. 
 We set out to test the validity of the conventional wisdom in several areas: specifically, 
the relationships between transaction costs and 1) trade size relative to market capitalization, 2) 
trade size relative to average trading volume, 3) management style, 4) patience in trading, and 5) 
use of crossing networks. 
 Some findings are surprising, although they must be taken with the appropriate caveat: 
These transactions all come from a single pension fund, and generalization to all funds may be 
premature.  However, as these results have become more widely known, several other 
individuals, from the United States and Japan, have told me they have observed very similar 
effects in their independent analyses of trading data.  They have sent in charts of thousands of 
their trades that look remarkably like the charts in this article, so we believe it is safe to say these 
are not completely unique observations.  
At the end of this updated paper we examine (in less detail) an even larger and more varied set of 
US Equity transactions, with a total market value exceeding $18 billion. 
 
COSTS AND TRADE SIZE   
 What should we expect regarding costs and block size?  The most reasonable sounding 
model is first described in [Loeb 1983] and extended in [Loeb 1991].  This very plausible model 
is based on queries to brokers and market makers for blocks valued between $5,000 and $20 
million at various levels of market capitalization.  The 1991 paper generalized the earlier result 
by fitting an equation to the data. 
                                                 
9 www.plexusgroup.com  
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 The Loeb function predicts transaction cost (in percentage of value) as a function of trade 
size expressed as a percentage of shares outstanding and market capitalization.  Exhibit 3 shows 
these predictions.  Our expectation is that a scatter plot of cost versus size as a percentage of 
shares outstanding for the 13,651 transactions in our sample would lie along these lines. 
 
Exhibit 3 
Expectations – Costs versus Block Size 
 
 
 Exhibit 4 shows a pattern clearly different from our expectations.  The largest trades have 
costs much lower than those predicted by the model.  The highest and lowest percentage costs 
are associated with the smaller trades.  Many trades, of all sizes, have negative costs; that is, they 
produce transaction profits.  Overall, costs rise slightly as trade size increases, but they rise less 
than expected.  What is responsible for this?  It may be that these are largely actual trades, not 
suppositions.  Apparently, when real orders are filled using real money, block traders can deliver 
better performance than the Loeb model predicts. These lower-than-expected costs for the largest 
orders seem to reflect the self-selection resulting from the attention traders give them, they are 
more likely to take place when they can be done most effectively. 
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Exhibit 4 
Observations – Costs Versus Block Size 
 
 One objection to the use of percentage of shares outstanding as a standardized measure of 
order size is that it is a poor indicator of the actual difficulty of a trade.  Many shares are closely 
held and do not trade very often.  Looking at trade size as a percentage of average daily volume 
may be more appropriate.  A scatter plot of the same transactions with the size as a percentage of 
the three-day average volume (prior to the decision date) is shown in Exhibit 5.  This appears to 
be a better measure of size, but it still fails to explain the surprising bulge in both trading costs 
and profits for the smaller transactions.  For these smaller trades, the costs substantially offset the 
profits, suggesting that the cumulative price of “no-brainer” executions is much higher than 
realized. 
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Exhibit 5 
Observations – Costs Versus Block Size 
 
 This is illustrated when we look at net percentage trading cost by order size, as shown in 
Exhibit 6.  What does this mean in terms of actual dollar cost to the pension fund?  The answer is 
seen in Exhibit 7, which illustrates the total transaction costs by trade size.  The small orders 
represent the largest single contribution to total trading costs.   
 
Exhibit 6 
 
Net Trading Loss by Order Size  
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Exhibit 7 
 
Trading Loss by Order Size 
 
COSTS AND MANAGEMENT STYLE  
 What do we expect to observe when we look at transaction costs separated by 
management style?  An excellent discussion of this subject is found in [Collins and Fabozzi 
1991]. Patient disciplines, such as value and growth investing, have longer time horizons and are 
expected to have lower transaction costs.  Earnings strategies depend on quicker execution to 
capture the market’s reaction to differences between expected and actual earnings.  Index funds 
tracking small-capitalization stocks would be expected to have larger costs because of the 
characteristics of the smaller stocks compromising those indexes.  Execution costs for high-
capitalization index funds, such as those tracking the S&P 500, are expected to depend on the 
funds’ use of index futures to manage costs. 
 These expectations are summarized in Exhibit 8.  Observations of the actual transactions 
for different management styles are shown in Exhibit 9.  Management styles expected to exhibit 
the highest costs have the lowest costs, and vice versa.  This surprising result suggests that 
something may be peculiar to this particular fund (as suggested by the earlier caveats), or that 
our understanding of the relationship between management style and costs is in need of 
refinement, or that fund managers may not be rigorously adhering to their target style. 
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Exhibit 8 
Expectations — Costs and Management Style 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 9 
 
Observations – Costs versus Management Style 
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COSTS AND PATIENCE  
 Our expectation is that patience will be rewarded.  Patient trading allows short-term 
market volatility to work in your favor.  You have time to exploit crossing systems, which 
typically transact only once or twice a day.  The market impact of patient trades should be less 
than large trades executed in a hurry. 
 The reasons underlying our expectations regarding patience are illustrated in Exhibit 10, 
taken from [Collins and Fabozzi 1991].  The figure shows how opportunity cost and execution 
cost add up to the total cost of transacting (or not transacting).  Recall, however, that all the 
transactions we study are completed, so no opportunity cost is involved and we would expect to 
observe only the execution cost curve. 
Exhibit 10 
 
Expectations – Costs versus Time 
 
 These expectations are reinforced by the results of a real exercise inpatient trading 
reported in [Bodurtha and Quinn 1990], as shown in Exhibit 11.  This is an actual series of trades 
to construct a 350-stock portfolio to track the Russell 2000 Index.  The returns on the real and 
paper portfolios are shown in the upper chart, along with the implementation shortfall (the 
difference between these two curves).  This shortfall is almost zero for the first fifty days of 
patient trading.  During the period when the trading was done patiently, the real portfolio tracks 
the paper, with very low transaction costs.  When patience ran thin, the implementation shortfall 
rose dramatically, clear evidence that patient trading can pay. 
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Exhibit 11 
 
Results of Patient Program Trading 
 
 
 
 The lower chart shows that, after fifty days, the traders were losing patience and became 
more aggressive on size, increasing the percentage of remaining shares bid for from roughly 35% 
to 100% of the total remaining, and roughly doubling this “aggressiveness” on the price of their 
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limit orders10.  At day 63, they really wanted to get this over with, and again increased their 
aggressiveness on price.  
This set of transactions requires an extraordinary amount of patience, sixty-seven trading 
days.  Is this necessary?  Probably not, and the reason is an excellent example of how to use 
information from trading in portfolio management.  An incredibly large number of 350 stock 
portfolios will track the Russell 2000, so there is no reason to pick a fixed set of 350 names and 
stick with it for sixty-seven days.  They operate in the traditional manner: a portfolio manager 
constructs the list, passes it on to the trader, and waits for completion. 
Exhibit 12 is a look at the actual trades, typically quite large, which were spread over 
multiple days. It shows that patience was rewarded. 
Exhibit 12 
 
Mean Cost versus Days Between Decision &Transaction  
 
  
 A somewhat exotic alternative is to work the process as a substitution order.11  To do this, 
a larger set of names, perhaps 1,000, would have been generated in the first place.  The basic 
                                                 
10 Aggressiveness on price is measured by the position of the limit order price within the quote prevailing at the time 
the order is submitted.  Aggressiveness on size is measured by the percentage of shares remaining to buy, 
represented by the limit order size. 
11 This was first suggested (and implemented) by Evan Schulman at Batterymarch in the ‘70s, and is described in the 
Harvard Business School Case 1-286-113 
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patient trading tactic would be the same, but each day’s fills are fed back into the portfolio 
construction system as current holdings to generate an updated trade list.  Any of the 
“substitutable” names can be used, rather than waiting for low-cost opportunities to trade the 
original fixed list.  Undoubtedly, the process could have been completed in less time, with 
comparable lower costs. 
 Why is this not done more often?  Many investors do not want to substitute one stock for 
another. This is feasible only for certain passive portfolios, or active managers looking to adjust 
industry or sector exposures. Even in 2001, most standard trading systems do not support it, but  
specialized automated systems can and do allow management of thousands of dynamically 
changing orders, modifying or canceling them as the market moves and as executions occur.  It is 
time to fire up the twelve cent Ferrari, i.e., the computerized trading/portfolio management 
support tolls made possible by that factor of 400 million in technological growth.  Today’s 
automated systems can, and do, manage the task of controlling this type of electronic order 
working to achieve best execution in a broader sense. 
 
COSTS AND CROSSING   
 One reason patience pays is that patient traders participate in crossing networks more 
often, and crossing should reduce execution costs.  The reason for this expectation is illustrated 
in Exhibit 13, which shows the components of trading costs.  The two major crossing networks 
are ITG’s POSIT, which does multiple intraday, midquote crosses, and Instinet’s Global 
Crossing Network, which does an after-the-close, closing price cross.  Both systems have low 
commissions because the intermediaries are removed from the trading process.  No price 
concession for size in excess of the quoted size exists, because no size is quoted.  The price is 
independent of transaction size. Both have grown in volume and scope since the first version of 
this paper appeared. International versions of both systems are now operating and gaining 
traction  
Exhibit  13 
 
Expectations – Crossing and Transaction Costs 
 
Factors lowering costs for crossed trades include mid-quote or closing price, no concession, and 
low commissions. (Source: Loeb 1983) 
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RECAPPING THE PROBLEM AND FINDING A SOLUTION   
 When we examine a large number of actual transactions made by a large U.S. pension 
fund, we find:  
• The implementation shortfall costs for large trades are much lower than expected. 
• Many small to midsize trades generate a transaction profit. 
• A large number of unexpectedly costly small to mid-sized trades make a disproportionate 
contribution to the total implementation shortfall.  
• New trading technology is designed to help investment firms control the costs of the 
smaller trades which represent the largest contribution to their total transaction costs. 
 If the larger trades are being executed well, with costs below reasonable expectations, 
and some trades have negative implementation costs (i.e., profits), then the problem illustrated in 
Exhibit 14 is fairly obvious.  The solution to this problem is to find those thousands of costly 
transactions (in the upper left portion of the figure), and those trading tactics, market channels, 
and brokers have been most effective in executing similar trades in similar circumstances, with 
similar motivations. 
Exhibit 14 
 
Problem Trades  
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COST REDUCTION LESSONS  
 This analysis suggests several ways to reduce costs: 
• Value is added by skilled equity block traders.  Because of constraints on their time and 
availability, these traders can handle only a small fraction of the total order flow.  If the 
high-cost smaller trades, which would not normally be sent to block desks, could be 
given the benefit of their attention, we could expect better execution. 
• Patient trading and automated liquidity-seeking trading strategies may be appropriate to 
keep the transaction costs below the anticipated alpha added by the manager.  Electronic 
trading and order working systems allow the use of computerized trading strategies that 
would be impossible by other means.  Price-sensitive demand schedules and substitutions 
are also useful here. 
Complex trading techniques incorporating multiple layered strategies allow a variety of 
techniques to be used together, choosing which ones to apply based on market conditions and 
cost feedback information, is described in [Leinweber 1994].  The basic idea behind these 
electronic order-working strategies is to use information from current and prior trading to 
directly affect the outcome of the trading process.  Electronic trading systems provide a 
uniquely powerful means of capturing this information and exploiting it in ongoing trading.  
Electronic order working is a general term for this type of trading.  The basic ideas behind 
electronic order working are: 
• Exploit the multiple execution channels available today. 
• Allow short-term market volatility to work in your favor. 
• Apply the techniques simultaneously to a large number of orders. 
• Incorporate feedback from the results of trading strategies on multiple time scales 
to refine the performance of those strategies.  As stated (and elaborated in great 
detail) in [Grossman 1989], the “very activity of trading produces information 
which affects its outcome.” 
• Identification of expensive problem trades before they are made.  There are two aspects 
to this.  A general approach is to avoid trading in illiquid stocks by careful consideration 
of the investable universe and the sizes one is willing to trade within that universe.  A 
more particular approach is to try to predict costs for each transaction, and use this 
information in portfolio decisions.   
 
Average liquidity is relatively simple to estimate. Short term variations are harder to 
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predict accurately. However the ability to use probe trades, which measure liquidity in 
real-time, and to quickly incorporate the results of recent trades, brings a timely source of 
data to the process.   
 
GUARANTEED PRINCIPAL BIDS 
 An important cost control strategy is guaranteed principal bid (or package) trading.  GPB 
traders receive a firm bid on an entire portfolio from a broker based on disclosure of 
characteristics of the portfolio, not the disclosure of its constituents.  Typically, this transaction 
is priced in advance, in cents per share or basis points off the closing prices for the stocks.  This 
can be regarded by the portfolio manager as a perfectly accurate prediction of transaction costs. 
 Brokers seek to match a large number of such portfolios, and thus reduce the risk that 
their cost of trading the unmatched stocks in the market will exceed their revenue from the 
guaranteed principal bid.  One of the difficulties of GPB trading from the point of view of the 
manager is the difficulty of obtaining bids from a variety of brokers who all want different 
information describing the portfolio.  CompBid, an electronic market to obtain multiple bids on a 
portfolio trade, operated for a time in the nineties, but has vanished. Certain agency-only brokers 
now provide a similar service. 
 
COST PREDICTION AND GUARANTEED PRINCIPAL BIDS 
 If we could predict trading costs with perfect accuracy, we would just add them to our 
decision prices and make perfectly informed decisions.  There is some evidence of predictability, 
but these predictions are far from perfect.  When we use a guaranteed principal bid, we can 
predict costs with perfect accuracy.  That is the guarantee. 
 This is illustrated in Exhibit 15.  The solid line shows the expected transaction costs.  The 
scatter points show the actual costs.  This time there are no surprises.  This is particularly 
valuable for quantitatively managed portfolios, which can be selected with known costs going 
into the optimizer or other system used in the portfolio construction process. 
Many managers rely heavily on GPBs.  This trading technique is not a magic bullet.  It 
entails a close relationship with the brokers to define the liquid universe and portfolio 
characteristics that result in acceptable costs.  This is particularly true for market-neutral funds, 
as there is far less liquidity on the short side of the market in many countries. 
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Exhibit 15 
       Guaranteed Bids Remove Uncertainty 
 
 By carefully structuring GPB trades, transaction costs for these portfolios have been held 
to less than half the reported averages for institutional equity portfolios in their respective 
countries (see [Pérold and Sirri 1996]). 
 Are GPBs a free lunch for equity managers?  No.  The guarantee typically applies to only 
one portfolio at a time.  While there will be no unanticipated market impact for each individual 
portfolio, brokers are under no obligation to maintain the same pricing for subsequent portfolio 
trades.  The impact costs can be just as real, but delayed.  New electronic trading systems 
increase the liquidity and efficiency of the GPB market by lowering barriers to entry and 
increasing the likelihood that dealers will find matching transactions.7 
 
CHANNELS AND TOOLS FOR ELECTRONIC EXECUTIONS 
 We have discussed using electronic trading systems as a means to reduce costs.  Traders 
face a growing, overlapping, and often bewildering array of choices in this regard.  Chris Keith, 
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formerly of the NYSE, describes the situation as “liquidity divided by confusion equals a 
constant.”  Buy-side traders are increasingly motivated to disintermediate their trades, at the 
same time that the brokers who have been the intermediaries are trying to attract more of them.  
They face shifting and expanding array of diverse execution alternatives, and technologies to 
manage them. A thorough review of these alternatives would triple the size of the article, but it is 
worthwhile to include a perfunctory scan of some of the systems being used for electronic 
trading of U.S. equities today. 
• Flextrade12 includes a variety of analytic tools and access to multiple execution 
channels, including broker desks. There are preconfigured and customizable 
order-working programs for a range of trading situations. The technology can also 
be used for European and Japanese equities. 
• ITG’s Quantex13 system is a versatile means to access execution paths and to 
direct executions using market data and feedback from trades in process.  Many 
electronic order-working strategies can be implemented.  Quantex traders can 
choose to execute orders electronically, in the POSIT cross, or manually through 
brokerage desks.  ITG also operates in Australia, Europe and Canada. 
• Instinet’s Order Management System14 provides access to both the continuous 
Instinet market and the crossing networks, which cross orders after market hours 
at closing prices.  The Order Management System can work orders using a variety 
of intraday strategies, with residuals being sent to the cross. International market 
access is supported. 
• Lava Trading15 systems consolidate market data information from multiple ECNs 
and exchanges into a single, high-performance data feed. Traders can access this 
information and submit orders using a unified order execution interface. 
• Universal Network Exchange16, UNX is a modern ASP (Internet Application 
Service Provider) system to provide sophisticated, customizable tools for traders 
to operate effectively and anonymously across a wide range of liquidity sources 
for US equities. Direct, VPN and web access are supported. The core of the 
system is a sophisticated algorithm that sweeps multiple execution venues to 
discover hidden liquidity within traders’ constraints. 
                                                 
12 http://www.flextrade.com  
13 http://www.itginc.com/products/quantex/quantex.html. For more details, see Leinweber and Beinart [1995]. 
14 http://www.instinet.com/equity_marketplace/oms/overview.shtml  
15 http://www.lavatrading.com 
16 http://www.unx.com  
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This is not an exhaustive list of the choices for electronic equity executions and does not 
begin to cover the alternatives in the depth they deserve.  These systems differ in the type of 
order working control they provide and, in many cases, in the structure of the combined markets 
they create.  The important point is that liquidity is where you find it, and there are many places 
and ways to look for it. 
 
TEN YEARS AFTER: 
A LARGE SCALE LOOK AT INSTITUTIONAL TRADING IN 2001 
Ten years ago, when we first saw the trumpet shaped scatter plots of implementation 
shortfall versus order size (exhibits 4 and 5) our first reaction was that we must have made an 
awful mistake. Surely, the largest costs wouldn’t be associated with the smallest trades. So we 
cross checked everything we had three different ways, going back to the original transaction 
records to make sure what we were seeing was really there. It all matched to the penny, they 
were real. 
When the AIMR decided to include the first version of “Using Information from 
Trading…” in CFA readings, it resulted in a longer and wider circulation than most articles. 
Consequently, quite a few people were inspired to make their own scatter plots of transaction 
costs and order size17.  They are remarkably similar. Over the years, I’ve received nice collection 
of trumpet shaped diagrams, mostly from the US, but Canada, Europe, Australia and Japan are 
there too.18 
A new dataset of over 14,000 US equity trades, totaling a healthy $18 billon, was made 
available just in time to be used for the anniversary revision of this paper.  In many ways, it is 
much richer than the original – it includes all 2001 buys, sells, short-sales and buys-to-cover by 
Aronson+Partners19, a multi-strategy US institutional manager.  The picture is there in Exhibit 
16, the same trumpet pattern appears again.  
The data summarized in this one picture is certainly worthy of a more in-depth analysis 
than time and space allow here20. But a slightly closer look is informative. Trade sizes averaged 
26% of a day’s volume, ranging up to 841%. Costs for individual trades vary widely, ranging 
                                                 
17 If you are inclined to do this, don’t bother with Excel or PowerPoint, unless you have only 255 trades. You’ll need 
some kind of industrial strength statistical package to handle thousands of points. Try Matlab, SAS, or S-plus. 
18 The last ten years have also seen a greater focus on global equity transaction costs. See [Domowitz, Glen and 
Madhavan 2001] and [Perold and Sirri 1997] 
19 www.aronsonpartners.com  
20 This is in fact, a work in progress, and will be forthcoming later in 2002. Watch www.hss.caltech.edu/~djl/ 
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from a high of 76% to a 42% profit (these, and a few other extreme outliers are not shown on the 
chart).  
 
Exhibit 16 
$18 Billion in U.S. Equity Trades (2001) 
 
$18 Billion in US Equity Trades (2001)
 
Source: Aronson+Partners 
 
The outliers are unimportant. The aggregate message here is that there are 
implementation shortfall trading costs totaling $15.1 million. This is offset by trading profits of  
$8.8 million, for a net trading cost of $6.3 million for the year, an average of 35 basis points. 
$6.1 million in transactions costs will put you high on your brokers’ holiday gift lists. 
Indeed, there are many large cheeseballs arriving at the Aronson+Partners trading room at year-
end. But they could very easily be larger. The firm is very focused on effective trading. They 
have developed a particularly effective strategy, exploiting a wide range of traditional, 
electronic, and package trading tactics. Costs are closely monitored and used to inform future 
trading. They use “information from trading in trading and portfolio management” effectively to 
improve investment performance. 
 27
Could they do better? Most likely yes. More than 92% of the $15 million in shortfall 
costs was due to small trades, under 25% of average daily volume. There are just too many of 
them to work carefully without a higher level of automated assistance. If these small trades are as 
simple as everyone seems to think, this portion of costs can be reduced substantially.  
 
SUMMARY 
Equity markets and the tools used to participate in them have been transformed by 
technology.  These changes affect all participants in the process.  Investors have new ways to get 
their money’s worth from equity management, and managers have new ways to transmit value.  
Trading is a critical link in the process. 
There are repeated lessons in pictures of trading we see in all these trumpet-shaped 
charts, spanning ten years, and (thanks to all the outside correspondents) many managers and 
many countries. Large numbers of expensive, small “no-brainer” trades represent large potential 
savings, which goes directly to improved performance. 
Intelligent “robotic” trading systems will have a hard time finding eight days volume of a 
stock, in a hurry. But they are ideally suited to sweeping multiple pools of liquidity, remaining 
cognizant of changing market conditions and the urgency of a particular trade. The large profits 
observed for many of these small trades underscore the potential for success in this area   
A great deal of innovation is directed toward these goals. The relentless progress in 
technology means that traders really do have everything computationally, and they face an 
interesting set of choices in deciding where to put it. 
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